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With a view to stimulating discussion regarding one of the most widespread 
methodological approaches in current legal studies and, in particular, in 
comparative private law, this paper challenges the notion of legal culture. 
Although focussing on the link between law and culture can be considered a 
heterodox approach that contributes to a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the legal system, this paper argues that the way in which legal 
culture is mostly understood in the discussions of comparative and European 
(private) lawyers is biased such that instead of shedding light on the deeper 
dynamics of the legal system it rather obfuscates them. This is mostly due to a 
static understanding of legal culture as national legal culture. Rather than 
erroneous, this conceptualisation appears as insufficient. This hints at the 
necessity of adopting a dynamic and pluralistic understanding of legal culture 
that escapes hegemonic consequences. 
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In academic debates about the relationship between national and 
supranational law, one increasingly encounters the argument – either 
explicit or implicit – that the diversity of ‘legal cultures’ existing in 
various countries represents a constraint on either the feasibility or 
desirability of greater harmonisation and convergence of national legal 
systems. Laws are the direct manifestation of the culture of particular 
communities and as such are necessarily local constructions which 
should possibly be protected. According to that view, it makes little 
sense – and it can be even dangerous – to continue imposing 
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regulations derived from the supranational level when it is clear that 
the cultural pluralism existing in different nations will necessary lead 
to regulatory failure. In this sense, not only positive laws and the 
practices of legal operators differ, but even the cultural diversity of 
citizens impacts and indirectly shapes the law.1 This approach, which is 
widely used in academic as well as political debates about the 
Europeanisation of law, is in reality built upon the broader 
comparative law concept of the impossibility of legal transplants and 
the legal sociological literature on the distinction between legal and 
social rules. Applied in the European context, which we can take here 
as a recurring and revealing example to give substance to more 
notional considerations, such an approach represents a strong and 
interesting reaction to the now traditional and ‘orthodox’ view among 
EU lawyers that law can be used to produce integration of legal 
systems and shape legal cultures2 rather than depend upon them. That 
view poses virtually no conceptual limits on the possibilities of 
supranational law and tends to disregard its concrete impact in specific 
contexts. Indeed, the cultural argument has been of fundamental 
importance especially in the extensive discussions about the 
Europeanisation of private law, but re-emerges in different forms also 
in the debates among public lawyers about the ‘constitutional 
identities’ of the Member States, let alone in the political discourse. 
What are, in reality, distinct notions of legal culture and legal identity 
tend to merge in lawyers’ discussions so that references to legal culture 
in this sense entail a defence of cultural pluralism and the protection 
of one’s identity. To cope with this cultural critique, advocates of 
Europeanisation are most likely to either deny the cultural dimension 
of legal rules3 or, less frequently, to show that there is also a European 
dimension to legal culture, 4  often with a view to support the 
                                                            
1 For a wide range of contributions dealing with the different links between law and 
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November 2011; MW Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture (Deventer: Kluwer 
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Europeanisation project. More seldom are attempts to deconstruct the 
notion of legal culture itself, either in its national or European 
dimension. 5  This paper argues that the latter approach is much 
needed.  
  
To be sure, elaborated in scholarship we find a new deeper heterodox 
approach to analysing the dynamics of European legal integration that 
differs from the usual positivist and hierarchical approach. However, 
even if it is employed to challenge the general orthodox view of EU 
law, the new emphasis on cultural pluralism and the law is also at 
closer examination not a new and heterodox approach at all. Certainly, 
it represents a valuable broadening of the methodology most often 
employed in the study of law, which has traditionally been positivistic 
or dogmatic on the basis of the idea that there could be a ‘pure’ theory 
of law, which does not deny political elements that surround the legal 
rules but rather neglects them. Nevertheless, this short paper objects 
that even the employment of the notion of legal culture might lead to 
more orthodox outcomes than expected, paradoxically impoverishing 
rather than enriching the legal debate unless particular care is used 
when referring to the notion of ‘legal culture’. 
 
The aim of this paper is not to attempt to re-establish the supposed 
primacy of the traditional positivist view, which is focussed only on the 
law in the books and simplistically (or optimistically) assumes that the 
legal rule will be followed by its addressees producing social change. 
Nor does it suggest that law is a ‘technical’ matter independent of 
culture. Rather, the paper aims to critically address and reconstruct the 
only apparently heterodox approach focused on legal culture, 
suggesting that this relies on too static an understanding of culture. 
The main argument is that such use of legal culture presupposes 
homogeneity, de facto reproducing hegemony, which also explains its 
success as an argument to support particular legal-political projects. To 
show this, references to the evolution of the concept as well as to other 
disciplinary fields from which the notion is borrowed will be made 
throughout. The paper therefore initially sketches out the origins and 
development of the notion and later shows by means of simple 
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5  For a more critical account of the concept of legal culture, see R Michaels, 
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Europäischen Privatrechts. Band II (Mohr/Siebeck: Tübingen 2009) 1255. 
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examples how this concept might offer a misleading image of 
homogeneity within communities if interpreted in too static a way. It 
concludes by addressing the political potential of the references to that 
notion and suggests a dynamic and pluralist interpretation of culture as 
a more appropriate tool to describe the multifaceted interrelation 
between law and society. 
 
II. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 
 
To support the claim that the success of the idea of legal culture is not 
evidence of the development of a new approach to law, it would be 
sufficient to quickly turn an eye to (not only legal) history. This can 
also help us understand the ideological connotations of the approach 
as well as its limits. From history, becomes apparent that a wide range 
of adherents of extremely diverse methodological and political 
approaches to legal studies already employed similar arguments, from 
– most recently – critical scholars to – going back in history – 
communitarians, nationalists, romantics and all the way back to 
Aristotle at least. However, this does not yet tell us much, and it would 
be misguided to assume the continuity of an argument through such a 
long historical period without considering the changing context in 
which it developed and was employed. For this reason, if it were 
necessary to pin down a particularly revealing period in history that 
has most strongly shaped the current understanding of legal culture, 
one could certainly say that it was Romanticism. In the legal field, it 
was the German Historical School that mostly contributed to the 
development of the idea in its modern version, 6  soon hijacked by 
nationalist movements linking the specificity of cultural traits with the 
rising idea of the nation state.7 
 
Historians (not legal historians) have already explained how the rising 
nation state has required a nationalisation of culture in the first 
                                                            
6 The deeper historical roots are revealed by J Schröder,‘Zur Vorgeschichte der 
Volksgeistlehre. Gesetzgebungs- und Rechtsquellentheorie im 17. und 18. 
Jahrhundert (1992) 109 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. 
Germanistische Abteilung 1. 
7 G Comparato, ‘The Long Shadow of the Volksgeist, or: the Nationalist Dimension 
in European Private Law Debate’ (2012) 8 European Review of Contract Law 245; H 
Dedek, ‘When Law Became Cultivated: “European Legal Culture” between Kultur 
and Civilization’, in G Helleringer and K Purnhagen (eds) Towards a European Legal 
Culture (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2014) 351. 
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instance, as a (very successful) attempt to delineate some characteristic 
features holding together its own citizens and differentiate them from 
those of other nations.8 Such a cultural understanding of the nation, or 
the Kulturnation as is well exemplified in the German terminology has 
been promoted by various means, including the creation of a common 
national press, a common educational system and, even plainly an 
‘invention’ of the national tradition.9 In addition, law has been – and 
still is being – used as an instrument for the State to shape popular 
culture.10 It is neither possible nor necessary here to expand upon the 
huge debates in political science discussing the question of whether 
culture was plainly invented or whether the nation state just 
institutionalised a series of existing cultural characteristics. To avoid 
chicken-and-egg discussions, it suffices here to say that a certain 
standardisation of culture has been produced by the establishment of 
the nation state.  
 
In respect of the law, this leads to a particular result. If both the law 
and culture are nationalised, it is easy to establish their overlap in the 
form of a national legal culture. These events have led to the almost 
full alignment of legal culture with the ‘national legal culture’ that is 
today perceivable in most debates about the law. The increased 
complexity of the modern (more or less) globalised world and the 
amplified intersection of very different legal orders and populations 
have only favoured the re-emerging of these arguments in the legal 
discourse. In spite of its ‘standardising’ origin, (national) legal culture 
is now more often than not employed as an argument to protect 
diversity of identities, which  are continuously threatened by new 
levelling supranational legislation, and in broader terms the idea of 
cultural pluralism. 
 
What is more, the protection of cultural pluralism goes beyond a 
simple recommendation; it is rather a normative principle, although 
quite an unclear and controversial one, within the legal order of the 
                                                            
8 AM Thiesse, La création des identités nationales : Europe XVIIIe-XXe siècle (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil 1999). 
9  EJ Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’ in EJ Hobsbawm and T 
Ranger (ed), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983) 
1. 
10 See, with a focus on the UK: S Hall, ‘Popular culture and the State’, in T Bennett, 
C Mercer and J Woollacott (eds), Popular Culture and Social Relations (Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press 1986) 22-49. 
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European Union that is protected by the provisions of the Treaties 
concerning respect for the national identities of the Member States. 
Certainly, it would be interesting, although not particularly 
enlightening for our purposes, to insist on the particular political 
circumstances and concerns which surrounded the introduction in the 
Lisbon Treaties of those provisions that, at least symbolically, 
safeguard the constitutional specificities of the Member States. It 
would equally be interesting to consider how these provisions can de 
facto be contradicted by a series of other provisions in the same 
treaties. 11  However, the point here is rather that the respect of 
pluralism and national identities is also a normative requirement 
specifically in the European Union. 
 
III. PLURALISM AND HEGEMONY 
 
At any rate, regardless of the contentious historical roots of that 
concept, one might certainly argue that the idea of legal culture as an 
expression of pluralism is a valuable achievement in European legal 
studies. Cultural pluralism would appear as the perfect starting point 
to reflect seriously about the law in a complex context such as the 
European one. The EU, we might even say, is characterised on the one 
hand by an allegedly considerable diversity and, on the other hand, by 
harmonising tendencies which stand in contrast to that cultural 
diversity and that at any moment risk annihilating national 
competences. This being so, what is wrong about continuing the 
Romantic tradition and accepting that private law – possibly as well as 
other fields of the legal system – is an expression of a national legal 
culture, and subsequently employing culture as a methodological 
instrument to analyse the law? All in all, Romanticism is a magnificent 
intellectual movement -  if we just content ourselves with linking legal 
culture only to that movement and arbitrarily decide to ignore its links 
with both earlier and later less marvellous political developments. This 
might all be true, however, there is something profoundly anti-
pluralistic in this defence of cultural pluralism. 
 
An emphasis on national legal culture, in contrast to what one might 
expect, coincides with a defence of cultural hegemony that disrespects 
deeper cultural as well as political, social and economic considerations 
                                                            
11 LFM Besselink, ‘National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon’ (2010) 
6 Utrecht Law Review 36. 
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that inspire legal rules. In this sense, national legal culture does not 
help us to reach a deeper understanding of the law, but might rather 
impede us from doing so. Quite disappointingly, legal science at least 
in Europe seems to have embraced a rather minimalistic and static 
notion of culture borrowed from mainstream anthropology, ignoring 
those trends in anthropology which have discussed the notion of 
culture in more critical terms or exposed some of its limits.12 
The problem lies in our very conceptualisation of culture. In 
particular, this is mostly static and takes culture as self-contained, a 
‘monad’ that is internally coherent and discernible from others’ 
‘monads’ externally, without questioning its internal structure. This 
static conception, on the one hand, ignores links, parallels and 
interrelations between the different cultures represented as the 
necessary product of a specific historical process.13 On the other hand, 
it denies the existence of a much deeper cultural pluralism within the 
category that we take for granted. It has already been mentioned in a 
previous section of this contribution that the definition of culture 
requires in the first place a process of standardisation;  in other words, 
cultural homogenisation. This process might be spontaneous and 
endogenous to a particular community, or it might be authoritatively 
steered by elites or political institutions with a deliberate view to 
imposing a particular set of values. In this context, cultural 
homogeneity coincides with cultural hegemony. If this is true, the 
question that we should ask ourselves while employing the notion of 
legal culture is whether we are defending pluralism as we claim to be 
doing, or if we are in fact supporting hegemony. 
 
In political philosophical terms, this aspect can be exemplified in the 
debates opposing the similar positions of liberal nationalists and 
communitarians. While the former highlights the homogeneity of the 
national category, the latter challenges it and rather pleads for policies 
of recognition. Nonetheless, communitarian policies of recognition in 
turn get challenged by those who argue that such policies embody the 
                                                            
12  See U Hannerz, Transnational Connections. Culture, People, Places (London: 
Routledge 1996). 
13 By the same token, Duve has recently criticised the general approach to European 
legal history which offers the ‘self-assurance’ that one of Europe’s major 
achievements is its legal culture, rather pleading for a new combination of a 
regional focus and global perspectives: T Duve, ‘European Legal History – Global 
Perspectives’, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper 
Series, No. 2013-06. 
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same hegemonic practice, disrespecting the values and the views of 
some categories of people within the recognised community. More 
specifically, the hegemonic potential of the concept can be highlighted 
referring to the feminist critique. Especially within the ambit of critical 
legal studies, feminist authors lamented that legal systems generally 
embody masculine values imposing its rules and ultimately values on 
women under the false representation of a homogeneity that in reality 
preserves the masculine standpoint. Criticising communitarian 
representations of multiculturalism, feminist scholars have highlighted 
the risk that policies of recognition in favour of specific minorities 
contribute to the oppression of women in those communities, making 
women vulnerable to the injustice perpetrated by the majority values of 
the group, so that such cultural policies ultimately work ‘to reinforce 
some of the most hierarchical elements of culture’.14 
 
Let us then continue employing the gender example to highlight this 
dimension, as well as the case of family law since its cultural dimension 
is quite self-evident and even allows us for some audacious historical 
cross-references, in contrast other fields of private law where the 
cultural and political dimension is often concealed under a veil of 
apparent technical neutrality. Gustav Hugo, generally regarded as the 
founder of the Historical School of Law (the most famous scholar of 
which was Savigny), made the observation that in countries where the 
fertility and beauty of women tend to diminish rapidly, polygamy tends 
to be more accepted in law. This vigorously illustrates the link between 
culture and the law.15 Although the concrete link between this cultural 
factor and the law is not further discussed, one can imagine that 
polygamy and the beauty of women are correlated in Hugo’s idea since 
polygyny would simply give the husband the possibility to have a wide 
range of wives of different ages so as to rapidly ‘replace’ the elder ones. 
Whatever the concrete reason might be, and even praising the efforts 
of Hugo to contextualise the law and relativize its underlying values, 
there is no doubt that by any standard this is to be regarded as quite a 
sexist practice. Accepting for a moment this explanation, it would 
clearly appear that this conceptualisation of the law – and in broader 
terms the legal cultures of all polygyny-permitting countries –
                                                            
14 A Schachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions. Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) 3. 
15  G Hugo, Lehrbuch eines civilistischen Cursus, 2.Band [1799] quoted by J 
Schröder,‘Zur Vorgeschichte der Volksgeistlehre’ 31. 
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completely embodies a point of view that coincides with the prevailing 
male perspective. The feminist critique would be to ask where the 
women’s perspective is, and question whether we can be sure that 
what we have identified as legal culture of a country is not just the 
recognition on anthropological terms of a particular (male) point of 
view probably not necessarily shared by others (female)? 
 
The aim of this example is certainly not to deem a particular legal 
regime or rule as more or less appropriate to represent pluralism or, on 
the other hand, to comply with some supposed universal value which 
should be embraced by all States. Rather, it aims to show that such a 
static representation of culture as referred to by a country and in its 
law in general terms might fail to describe other cultural, social and 
political dynamics within the society. This contributes to offering an 
image of homogeneity, while at the same time promoting hegemony. In 
the example considered, for instance, the existence of a specific and 
quite early feminist debate in countries where polygyny has been 
traditionally allowed by law indeed offers evidence of the more 
intricate and pluralistic dynamics of culture and family law, notably 
including the continuous cross-fertilisation of different cultures.16 
 
Outside of the legal field, therefore, these and other considerations 
have been employed to challenge a certain conceptualisation of 
culture, as this ‘operates in anthropological discourse to enforce 
separations that inevitably carry a sense of hierarchy’17, while cultural 
classifications grouped on the basis of nationality continue show 
several methodological flaws.18 
 
IV. RISKS FOR LEGAL STUDIES 
 
Keeping in mind these reservations, and limiting our view to legal 
studies, we can perceive that this approach might lead to quite peculiar 
results that are plainly in contradiction with the initial expectation that 
the employment of the cultural argumentation might offer a heterodox 
alternative to the positivistic approach. Due to the way in which legal 
                                                            
16 Q Amin, ‘The Liberation of Women’ [1899] in The Liberation of Women and The 
New Woman. Two Documents in the History of Egyptian Feminism (Cairo: The 
American University 2001) 83. 
17 J Abu-Lughod, ‘Writing Against Culture’, in RG Fox (ed) Recapturing Anthropology. 
Working in the Present (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press 1991) 137. 
18 J Leerssen, ‘Over nationale identiteit’ (1988) 15 Theoretische geschiedenis 417-429. 
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culture is employed as a tool to explain the rule, it often ends up 
offering de facto the allegedly anthropological justification for a 
positive rule, such that anthropology paradoxically pays lip service to 
legal positivism.  
 
This explains in the first place why scholars, in attempting to elaborate 
new and more comprehensive categories than those usually proposed 
by the comparative lawyers often criticised for being positivistic and 
Western-centric, tend to re-propose those very same comparative law 
categories when they themselves catalogue legal cultures. They will, for 
instance, distinguish a German legal culture from a French legal 
culture, a common-law legal culture from a civil law legal culture19 or, 
in broader terms, even Western legal culture from socialist legal 
cultures.20 Again, a word of caution is needed: This is not to say those 
cultures do not exist or are wrong conceptualisations of legal diversity, 
just as it is impossible to say that there is no difference between 
German and French positive law or the civil-law and the common-law 
approaches are identical. The point is rather that such a notion of legal 
culture is of limited use for adding something to what we already know 
from the study of positive law, other than a certain kind of cultural 
justification for the status quo which reinforces a particular 
distribution of power within the community. Rather, culture can 
become a useful descriptive tool for comparative law when if it is 
viewed as a dynamic concept, as it might serve for instance to explain 
the historical continuation of a pre-existing positivistic characteristic. 
As an example, the extent to which the ‘internal legal culture’ that was 
widespread in the now extinct socialist legal family has left an impact 
in the legal culture of certain countries might be investigated, to show 
whether a certain kind of socialist legal culture survives the death of 
socialist legal regimes (although in this case we are more precisely in 
the field of tradition rather than the one of culture).21  
However, the main difficulty lies not so much in the imprecision of 
general comparative categorisations (and this would honestly be quite 
an easy and banal criticism to make), but rather in the capacity of the 
                                                            
19 For instance, see P Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 
45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52. 
20 For instance, see HW Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (London: Prentice-
Hall 1976). 
21 R Mańko, ‘Is the Socialist Legal Tradition “Dead and Buried”? The Continuity of 
Certain Elements of Socialist Legal Culture in Polish Civil Procedure’, in T 
Wilhelmsson et al (eds), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe 83. 
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emphasis on legal culture to obfuscate internal social dynamics. In 
other terms, the approach poses major problems in addressing the 
pluralism existing within the community. As stated, the standardisation 
of the national culture has historically been an instrument to promote 
national unity at the price of the repression of infra-national 
differences. Legal scholars like to compare law to language, which can 
be a particularly fitting example to exhibit the popular origin of the 
law. However, accepting this fitting comparison, another similarity 
should not be ignored, which is that policies of linguistic unification 
are an example of the tendency to repress minorities: Education 
systems in most newly unified countries promoted the standardisation 
of the national language, which necessarily entails a repression or at 
least marginalisation of local vernaculars. According to this viewpoint, 
it is immaterial whether this process happened violently through 
persecution of linguistic minorities, through the prohibition of 
employing the language, or more liberally through valuable school 
education in the common language because the practical result is 
always a hegemonic one. The very same process might impact 
countless cultural minorities and their ability to reflect their interests 
in the rules of the legal order. 
 
Nonetheless, the example of linguistic minorities should not lead us to 
think that the question is just one of ethnic pluralism within a national 
state. Quite to the contrary, cultures and identities (a bit imprecisely 
assuming a certain degree of overlap between these concepts) can be of 
very different types: They can be ethnic, but may also be related to 
gender identity (as in the previous example), profession, social status 
and so on. This would obviously include also the important category of 
national identity. Each of these categories presents a set of ‘ways of 
doing things’22, as well as arguably a certain degree of homogeneity of 
preferences and interests.  
 
This is exactly the kind of pluralism which tends to be neglected by a 
too static definition of culture understood in ‘geographical’ terms. If 
one considers more concretely the specific case of the construction of 
the category of ‘national legal culture’ it becomes particularly clear that 
such neglect is not an accidental side-effect of standardisation but 
                                                            
22 RE Goodin, ‘Conventions and Conversions, or, Why Is Nationalism Sometimes so 
Nasty?’ in R McKim and J McMahan (ed), The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1997) 95. 
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most likely the deliberate objective of the representation of 
homogeneity within the national community. This was initially the 
suspicion of early socialists, 23  ie that the emphasis on national 
distinctiveness between the nineteenth and the twentieth century 
could be  an instrument to downplay social differences and ultimately 
weaken the labour movement which ideally aimed to unite workers 
beyond national borders. To put this concern more directly, as Anatole 
France famously stated speaking about the First World War: ‘on croit 




As for legal analysis, these considerations hint at the necessity of 
articulating further the category of legal culture as a general concept 
which covers a series of more specific and potentially different 
cultures. In the first sense, a fundamental distinction to be considered 
is the one between and internal and an external legal culture,24 which 
in our context could be further constructed as a distinction between 
the professional and the societal legal culture. It is, for instance, 
completely justified to assume a much higher degree of homogeneity 
within the professional legal culture (the way in which legal operators 
think about the law) that has been authoritatively created through legal 
education, as compared to the societal legal culture which should on 
the contrary characterise a much wider and heterogeneous group of 
people. This latter is, indeed, made up of a series of further cultures, 
identities and interests, of disparate national but also social, political 
and economic nature. Admitting this plurality, it would be flawed to 
assume the absolute prevalence of any of these cultures, for instance 
that the ‘national’ segment will always be more important than a social 
identity. In the same way it would be erroneous to think that social 
identities will always be more important than national ones. As stated, 
a dynamic understanding of cultures and identities requires that their 
interaction, including conflicts and overlaps in specific cases,25 should 
always be considered. 
                                                            
23 PJ Proudhon, Œuvres Choisies (Paris: Gallimard 1967) 207. 
24 LM Friedman, The Legal System. A Social Science Perspective (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1975) 223. 
25 In a recent quite provocative paper on EU law, for instance, a distinction has been 
proposed between centre, periphery (as geopolitical coordinates building upon 
national ones), businesses and workers as categories encompassing different 
‘interests, demands or claims’ which diverge or converge in concrete legal cases; D 
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It is important to highlight that these dynamics interest the 
construction of any legal system and the establishment of any political 
power. From this point of view, although in the specific European 
context the cultural argument is most often employed in opposition to 
the possibility of achieving more legal Europeanisation, even 
references to a common European legal culture – together with the 
emphasis on a common European interest – might easily be flawed by 
the same ideological preconceptions of legal culture when it refers to 
the nation or to other kinds of communities. In this sense, both at the 
local and at the supranational level references to common legal culture 
might easily respond to the very same proposition of promoting the 
edification of the community, in an attempt that with regard to the 
construction of the nation state historians have famously qualified 
‘nation-building’ and that, in a broader context, we can refer to as 
‘community-building’.26 
 
What is then the bottom line of these considerations? That culture 
should be avoided as a term? That culture by itself does not exist, or is 
always an ideological construction, so that in the end, modifying 
Margaret Thatcher’s famous remark, it should be concluded that there 
is no such thing as ‘culture’, just individuals? At this point, also the 
critique of (legal) culture faces the risk of becoming ideological – an 
inherently libertarian proposition meant to delegitimise and loosen 
community ties leaving the individual alone with her own 
deconstructed identity, interests and self-centred rationality in a 
further globalising world where there is increasingly less space for the 
public sphere. To be sure, Hayek employed arguments to sustain the 
pluralism of society and its separation from the State 27  that 
paradoxically perfectly echo those now used by progressive thinkers in 
favour of ‘multiple identities’.28 In this sense, the critique of national 
culture would have shifted from one end of the political spectrum to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Kukovec, ‘Law and the Periphery’ (2014) European Law Journal DOI: 
10.1111/eulj.12113. 
26 G Comparato, ‘Europe vs the Nation State in Private Law? Legal Cultures and 
their Community-building Function’, in G Helleringer and K Purnhagen (ed) 
Towards a European Legal Culture 329 
27 F.A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol.3. The Political Order of a Free 
People (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979), 140. 
28 A Sen, ‘Justice across Borders’, in P De Greiff and C Cronin (ed), Global Justice 
and Transnational Politics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002) 42. 
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the other, turning from an argument initially employed by socialists 
against a capitalism-driven State to an argument to advance the neo-
liberal liberation of the individual from her community and her 
inclusion in an increasingly less State-centred global economy. 
 
Rather, what is necessary is to dissect more clearly the idea of legal 
culture, sidestepping its employment as just a rhetorical expression to 
cover quite different concepts justified by different political agendas or 
preconceptions. In order to avoid this, what appears necessary is that 
culture be rather explored in a dynamic and pluralistic way. At the 
same time, such a dynamic and pluralistic interpretation of legal 
culture can help to steer clear of the risk that the notion is employed in 
an even unconsciously hegemonic way, to support the status quo and 
justify the prominence position of that cultural segment that has 
already managed to implant its own values and interests in the legal 
system. In this sense, clarifying the title of this contribution, the goal 
here is not much to ‘challenge legal culture’ per se, but rather to 
challenge the static way in which this is too often employed, in an 
attempt to problematise it without necessarily discarding it. 
